If we visit the City of London will see a famous Portobelo in the same call, or admire the tomb that honors the figure of Edward Vernon in Westminster Abbey, but the reality casts a dubious glory for them because of the actions of a Spanish sailor who shamefully and in parallel has been forgotten after his participation in one of the most unequal and bloody battles of history.

Figure 1 - Blas de Lezo and Olavarrieta

Blas de Lezo and Olavarrieta born in Tickets (Guipúzcoa, Spain) on February 3, 1689. The fourth of ten children, belongs to a family of lower nobility with marine illustrious among his ancestors and a people devoted almost exclusively to the sea. It is therefore not surprising that with just twelve years, in 1701, is enrolled as a midshipman in the service of the Count of Toulouse, Alexander of Bourbon, son of Louis XIV. It is integrated into the French army because Spanish was just nonexistent, the situation was dire and unfortunate reflection of the economic collapse and fall of the Habsburgs. Three years later explode the War of Succession in Spain, by not leaving any offspring Charles II, facing Philip of Anjou by the French and the Archduke Charles of Austria supported by England, as the latter feared the power to reach the Bourbons in the continent. It was against Velez-Malaga, 24 August 1704, when there is the most important naval battle of the conflict. In the battle fought Franco-96 warships (51 ships of the line, 6 frigates, 12 galleys, 8 fire ships and 19 other ships varied) and 68 Anglo-Dutch ships of the line, suffering casualties 1500 and 2700 respectively. Blas de Lezo participated in the battle to the Foudroyant (104) * paddling in an exemplary manner until a cannon ball shattered his left leg amputated teniéndosela below the knee. Due to the value shown in this predicament and fight himself, he was promoted to lieutenant in 1704 the High Board of Bajel by Louis XIV and offered assistant camera be the court of Philip V. Obviously required a long recovery and refused to be in court because seafaring ambitions know the arts and become a great commander. In 1705 again and provisions aboard the besieged Peniscola. After this harassed trade of Genoa to face the British taking Resolution (70), which yields to the Basque sailor. Continue patrolling the Mediterranean imprisoning many English ships carrying brave daring maneuvers with improper, so much so that is awarded allowing flights carrying their prey, his hometown. But then is required by his superiors and in 1706 ordered to supply the besiegers of Barcelona commanded a small fleet Drawing on his keen intelligence makes his task brilliantly, escapes and over the fence that set the British to prevent the supply . To do this left floating and burning damp straw to create a dense cloud of smoke to protect them, but also load "their guns with a thin shell caps with incendiary material inside, which, when hit set fire to the British ships" 1. The British are powerless such a display of ingenuity. Later he is posted to Fort St. Catherine of Toulon where it contacts the defense from the mainland in combat against the Savoyards. In this action and after the impact of a cannon in the fort, is a splinter lodged in his left eye, forever losing sight of it.

Figure 2 - Fighting the Stanhope.

After a brief convalescence is destined to the port of Rochefort where Coast Guard promoted to Lieutenant in 1707. They will make another great feat in 1710 performing on board the frigate Valeur, a dozen enemy ships, the youngest of 20 pieces, and subjected to an impressive fight against Stanhope (70) led by John Combs who tripled in strength. Mutual cannonade was maintained until Lezo maneuvers left the boat boarding enemy from a distance, when they launched the hooks ordered to carry it out, "When the English saw that panicked" 2. When the Spanish approach almost always outperformed their rivals so this version should not differ too much with reality as it is not explained to come out victorious when the crew of Lezo was remarkably lower than that of Combs. Anyway Blas de Lezo is covered with glory so great battle, in which even is wounded, and was promoted to Commander.

Figure 3 - Jorrando the captured Stanhope.

Passed in 1712 to serve the burgeoning Spanish Navy's fleet Andres del Pez since there was no point in French by distancing the French and Spanish monarchs. This famous Admiral was amazed at the value of Lezo and issued several letters that earned him his promotion to Captain a year later. Subsequently involved in the siege of Barcelona in command of Campanella (70), in which the September 11, 1714 is about too much momentum to their defenses and get a musket shot in the right forearm, leaving barely the tip to mobility the end of his days. Thus we have just 25 years the young Blas de Lezo eyed, lame, lame.

In 1715 the command of Our Lady of Begoña (54) and recovered from his wounds and is directed at a large fleet to recapture Mallorca, which is rendered without a flash. A year later leaves for Havana escorting a fleet of galleons in Lanfranco (60), ship to be removed from service because of their parlous state on his return to Cadiz. There he stays until 1720 when assigned a new ship also named Lanfranco (62) but also known as Leo Franco and Our Lady of Pilar and integrates it into a French-Spanish fleet commanded by Bartolome de Urdizu with the task of clean of pirates, and the South Seas called or what is the same the coast of Peru. The squad was composed by four Spanish warships, a frigate and French side by two French ships of the line. His first operations were against the two ships, the Success (70) and Speed ​​Well (70) of the English pirate John Clipperton, who managed to spare and after making some catches fled to Asia where he was captured and executed. However when the squad broke command fell to Lezo who was promoted to General of the Navy on February 16, 1723. At such times also have time for other conquests and May 5, 1725 takes the hand of Dona Josefa Pacheco Bustos, a year later would give him a son, also named Blas. The first task of which was squad leader of the south was to make it perfectly operational, for it needed three or four ships of war, but few were the means by which was, even having to scrap the frigate, named Pilgrim (36), for the sorry state it was. Fortunately two new ships were built by the Peruvian merchants pay what was owed to the Crown. With its small fleet of three ships is launched to patrol the Pacific and soon found five Dutch ships better gunships threading Lezo ordered the bow toward the enemy to approach it but it reacts in an organized and frustrates his intent, what the Spanish sailor responds ordering swiftly concentrate fire against most enemy ship, the Vlissingen (58). Such was the punishment that desarbolan and lowered should the flag and routed the rest. In another rear exit would be launched on six British warships performing at uniting all three to his squad. So armed Lezo succeeded in forming a more than sufficient to protect the Peruvian coast, but the new Viceroy had taken office for two years, scrapped and tried to put in positions of armed friends and family which led to the confrontation with Lezo. In that time the general defaults were aggravated by the blockade of the Viceroy himself. The situation became unsustainable, leading to demand the withdrawal, but the August 18, 1730 returned to Cadiz as head of the Fleet in the Mediterranean and pagándosele they should, after the intercession of Patiño, Minister of the Navy, aware of the need of such people in the Navy.

On November 28, 1731, distinguish and recognize the services of Admiral King, pointing out as distinctive for the flagship of Blas de Lezo, the Royal Family (60), the coat of arms of Philip V, leaving the purple flag with the arms of Spain, the orders of the Holy Spirit and the Golden Fleece around and four anchors at the ends.

Figure 4 - Standard of Lieutenant General of the Navy Don Blas de Lezo.

On 22 December the same year he again recognizes entrusting the transfer of Prince Charles to his Italian possessions. But before the end of the year again to take orders, you must retrieve two million pesos that the Bank retained St. George of Genoa to the Spanish crown. In command of six ships entering the port Genoese and is situated opposite the palace of the Doria carrying the royal flag as a sign of hostilities. Demand what is owed and gives a period of 24 hours for delivery threatening bombard the city, which finally delivers two million, but it is also bound by Lezo to honoring Spanish flag before heading back to the peninsula.

Blas returns to battle on board the Santiago (60), accompanied by a military force composed of eleven warships, seven galleys and numerous transport ships, with 30,000 men and 168 artillery pieces. This force under Count de Montemar recapture the July 2, 1732 the square of Oran. His boss, the pirate Bey They escaped and joined forces with the Bey of Algiers soon arranging an attack on the city. Thus Lezo back in February of 1733 to help her with the Princess (70) and Royal Family (60) and five other warships to aid Oran. The nine galleys blocking the port but were disbanding Lezo chased the ship Captain (60) of the Bey of Algiers to the inlet of Mostagán defended by two forts and 4000 enemies. Far from stopping, Lezo entered her impetuous as ever, sweeping the two fortifications with great skill of the gunners and assaulted the flagship to the terror of the Muslims.

Blas de Lezo, having made ​​all kinds of deeds and tremendous aura of sea lion, part of Cadiz on February 3, 1737, directing what would be the last race of the Indian Empire with a fleet of galleons in addition to the Strong (60 ) and the Conqueror (64), to Cartagena de Indias, as it has entrusted its defense as commanding general of the city. This place had become a geostrategic point of capital importance, for there passed the goods from the mainland and the Spanish possessions in South America. Its loss would collapse the Empire, the Spanish rulers knowing it and to the inevitable showdown with England went to Blas de Lezo to defend the city.

Cartagena de Indias was called "the key of the Empire" and to that end had the best and most extensive fortifications of all the viceroys. It is not surprising because previously he had suffered attacks of famous pirates. In 1542 the Frenchman Robert Baal making with 450 men, having only ten years after its founding. Another Frenchman, Martin Cote, also managed to take in 1559. It resisted the city in 1568 when Englishman Sir John Hawkins, slaver, besieged it for 8 days after his failed attempt at deception claiming to want to trade with the city. His compatriot Francis Drake, managed to conquer the city in 1586 and for one hundred days between February and April of that year was installed as governor causing numerous fires, destruction and looting everywhere, even in the Cathedral. He left the city after receiving a ransom. As can be seen the city was quite vulnerable and that the city was not fortified. At the request of the king, the military engineer Bautista Antonelli, began the fortification of Cartagena who planned and built the first walled defenses of the system, two centuries later, would turn the city into an impregnable fortress. Its walls were built of wood and fagots initially following their paths. He advanced the construction of the walls and bastions until the core of the city was well protected. It also built several forts (Manzanillo, Cruz Grande and Pastelillo) protecting access to the inner bay from the outside. After several shipwrecks increased the difficulty of access from the ocean to the outer bay by the channel Bocagrande, winning the role of Bocachica, where he built Fort St. Louis that would be followed later by three batteries to the east and by the strong San Jose on the west shore. The aim was to prevent access and movement of enemy ships in the bay that would allow support of any ground attack. But it also increased the power of guns and it was imperative to design increasingly powerful strengths. Thus was born the most imposing castle built by the Spanish in Cartagena, San Felipe de Barajas. It was located on the hill of San Lazaro, protecting the city from attack from land or the bay. In 1657 was completed the first nucleus of the castle on the hilltop, the modest Blas de Lezo bastion known and that has nothing to do with the colossal dimensions that would acquire embracing all the hill of San Lazaro, as preserved present. However in 1685 the British attack the city Henry Morgan and twelve years later, in 1697, it will successfully Pointis Baron of the French king taking orders. The latter would mean that "on the sea coast of Cartagena is a man invincible." Indeed the direct attack on the city from the north by the ocean was impossible due to the shallowness of it and the boats would be easy prey for the defenses of the city. In an analysis much later (1762) Antonio de Arévalo established three avenues of possible ground attacks in the city: on the West Bocagrande, for this the nozzle and the South la Popa. Pointis tried in 1697 by the beaches of Bocagrande, but was unable to effectively deploy artillery pieces, or settle the troops, or digging trenches or undermining the defenses as the water table quickly surfaced. So there were only two feasible routes of attack: on the south and east.

Figure 5 - Castillo de San Felipe de Barajas today.

Despite the magnificent fortifications Blas de Lezo found the defenses of the city in a terrible state. Had "a few bad artillery, almost out of ammunition and gunpowder there was only about 3300 pounds" 3. Since his arrival his only purpose was to supply the square and the fortification of the bay. This completely blind ordered Bocagrande channel creating a breakwater, so made sure that any attack by sea had to go through the strong Bocachica. Reinforced the garrisons of these forts, stretched between the same two strings to prevent access to the bay and put their boats to support them.

Figure 6 - Plan of Cartagena de Indias in a state of defense.

In 1739 England declares war on Spain, the so-called War of Jenkins's ear because Julio Leon Fandino, captain of a Spanish coast guard intercepted the smuggler Robert Jenkins Rebecca forgiving life but instead it made him cut his ear, after which he was released with this insolent message: "Go tell your King that the same thing if the same will not dare." The scandal was huge in England and was the perfect excuse to declare war, which actually was motivated by the greed of English merchants. So plan to dismember the Spanish empire that both coveted and in that plan contained Cartagena as the key to their purposes. This is prepared by a squadron under the command of Edward Vernon whose rivalry with Blas de Lezo was clear, the English admiral "noted this in his letters as eponymous adversary because it was a symbol of resistance to the ambition Hispanic English" 4. This is reflected in the written correspondence between the two admirals after the surrender without a struggle of Portobelo to the English: "It would have been me in Portobelo, you had not insulted with impunity the squares of the King my Lord, for the encouragement you missed the Portobelo I had left to hold his cowardice "5.

Spain had long known the exact intentions of England and the plan of Vernon, a Spanish spy in Jamaica dubbed the Paisano gave many details that even the Viceroy did not give enough credit Eslava to information: it was preparing a large fleet to throw at Cartagena pigs and also reported plans of attack on the square. By then the Spanish spy network exceeded the English, as an example suffice it to say they did not know the situation of having only defenses cartageneras information Pointis attack in 1697, 40 years ago.

In order to intimidate and gather information directly above the March 13, 1740 Vernon appeared before the city with eight larger ships, two fire-ships, two bombards and a steamer, which after blocking any communication with the outside began to bomb the Bocachica positions. But Lezo had removed some guns of 18 pounds of his ships which had greater range than the strong. In due course these guns fired from the jungle surprising Vernon boats that surrounded in the crossfire were forced to retreat to Jamaica. Although the English admiral returned on May 3 following with thirteen ships and bombard, only had time to recognize and flee the area quickly after being surrounded by the ships of Lezo.

On March 13, 1741 from the city are sighted some enemy sails, exactly one year after the first attack. The same day a French sloop, sent by General Leogan reports that up to the Spanish have had 130 candles for his defeat seem to go to Cartagena. When all enemy forces finally arrived two days later, the vision must have been shocking with endless wall of candles. Unfortunately for the defenders to information received by the French sloop was wrong. The forces which left Vernon showed clearly that this time there was a skirmish. The data sources vary, but the British fleet should consist of 180 ships, 23,600 soldiers and 3000 artillery pieces broken down as follows:

• 8 three bridges and ships of 80 to 90 guns.
• 28 ships of two bridges and 50 to 70 guns.
• 12 frigates of 40 guns.
• 2 bombards.
• 130 transports.
• 6237 English soldiers.
• 2763 American soldiers.
• 1000 Jamaican cane cutters.
• 12,600 sailors.
• 2620 naval guns.
• 1380 land guns.

Instead he was just Lezo with 6 ships, 2830 men and 990 artillery pieces broken down as follows:

• 6 ships of the line: Galicia (70) which was the flagship, the San Felipe (64), San Carlos (70), Africa (70) Dragon (64) and the Conqueror (64).
• 2230 Spanish soldiers: Infantry Regiments of Aragon, Toledo, Lisbon, Navarre, Fixed Square and the city militia.
• 600 Indian archers inside the province.
• 900 sailors.
• 80 gunners.
• 360 naval guns.
• 320 guns of the forts.
• 310 guns of the fortifications of the city.

Actually Lezo troops should have added about 6000 men, but because of yellow fever troops from the peninsula were drastically depleted before these events. Besides these troops met the target for the defense of the city to Spanish military brilliant as the very Viceroy Sebastian de Eslava as supreme commander, the commander of the Naval Station Blas de Lezo responsible for the defense, the intendant of the king and governor of the province Melchor de Navarrete Cartagena coordinating, managing and leading accounting of supplies and everything that has happened in the defense, Colonel Carlos Desnaux as Castilian Bocachica of San Luis and San Felipe de Barajas, and Captain Lorenzo de Alderete defending the land batteries pump. All in their different roles, will have a decisive action in what was to happen.

Vernon fakes, round and distracts attention from the coast, which is inaccessible by checking the city from its waterfront after trying to bomb the city with 17 ships and two bombards then turning Bocachica.

On March 17, begins the firing from the forts and batteries that entrance to the bay. This action occurred at all hours with an average of 62 shots each time, constantly attacking ships were renewed eight fours. But the Basque commander had prepared to minimize damage to your troops and take full advantage of the few resources they had. He placed the ships at the entrance of the bay to support the fire of the forts, while he was to use these "ramps under the guns shots to lengthen and shorten the time of the same" 6. In addition to the overwhelming numerical superiority cleverly chose the target of artillery, enemy ships dismast look something unusable for the rest of the campaign and to that end ordered the manufacture of chains and crowbars bullets that were carrying all the gear. Vernon's ships were surprised with impossible shots that tore their sails leaving them at the mercy of the enemy. Only in the battle of the twentieth the guns left five Spanish warships out of combat including two of three bridges. In parallel and in order to minimize their losses, Lezo ordered the battlements (the weakest part of a wall between which open the pockets of the guns) that were of stone and brick were reconstructed with sacks full of earth piled on other. This way when a cannonball hit not jumped those chips that caused havoc among the defenders and absorbed the shock of impact. Thus passed the days when Spanish troops rested but just put up with the permanent stake British ships.

Figure 7 - Battle in Bocachica.

Meanwhile, the attackers had landed on the nozzle (west of the city) distracting the attention of the Viceroy Eslava. But the British took note of the defenses before the first attack on Cartagena, as reflected in the letter of March 7, 1740 in Vernon led by their officers, and which indicated that the batteries in Tierra Bomba (the Bocachica East) could easily silence allowing it to land. As it happened, after removing the three batteries located east of Fort St. Louis, not without serious damage to ships Norfolk (80), Russell (80) and Shrewsbury (80), the British forces landed troops and artillery. Lezo raged against the viceroy had previously prevented it reinforce those positions and now the lock of the bay was about to jump. Despite being located under the protective eye of the weed, incredibly the British established their camp under the scope of the walls of St. Louis and placed their first pieces of the side opposite the camp, so that when the camp opened fire on the response received reflects the strong British surgeon's assistant: "This type of behavior to choose a camp under fire from the enemy walls, which I believe never before was done, I think, to accustom the soldiers Fire "7. Meanwhile Blas asked numerous times outings to prevent the enemy from their positions and build asentase a battery of artillery, which always refused Eslava, allowing it only when it had unambiguous information than they did the British. Unfortunately for the defenders it was late and were repulsed by a well-established rival. When the April 2 the English cleared the weeds allowed to see the newly constructed battery of 20 guns and 40 mortars, 24 pounds immediately opened fire. After 19 days of continuous bombardment, the April 5, 1741 British troops successfully launched a combined assault by land and sea against the fort of San Luis de Bocachica, who had such a gap could even get to load it. During this battle the already battered San Carlos (70), Africa (70) and San Felipe (64) caught fire and sank, while the Spanish troops retreated in disorder to the city by boat when the British ordered all put to the sword the garrison. Meanwhile Lezo ordered the unruly drilling Galicia (70) to blind passing Bocachica unfortunately the boat did not catch fire quickly and fell into English hands. Thus breaking the first line of defense Blas himself considered impregnable key and wanted to keep at all costs. Although the attackers suffered 1500 dead during the siege of the fortress, the situation became very expensive for them.

Tras la toma de Bocachica, Vernon manda la fragata Spence con dos oficiales capturados y el estandarte del buque insignia de Lezo, el Galicia (70), a Jamaica y Londres informando de la inminente toma de la plaza. Cuando la noticia llegó a la capital británica “ se dispararon salvas desde la Torre de Londres, las campanas de las iglesias se echaron a volar y la victoria fue celebrada con iluminación general y fuegos artificiales ” 8. Incluso el Parlamento mandó acuñar monedas conmemorativas, algunas se representaba a Lezo arrodillado (con ambos ojos, brazos y piernas sanos) entregando su espada al almirante inglés, y en las que rezaba la siguiente inscripción “ el orgullo español humillado por Vernon ”.

Figura 8 – Moneda conmemorativa de la “victoria inglesa” en Cartagena de Indias

La terrible situación para los defensores hace que el Virrey Eslava ordene entonces el abandono del fuerte de Cruz Grande considerando la imposibilidad de su defensa y el hundimiento de los intactos Dragón (64) y Conquistador (64) para cerrar el acceso a la bahía interior. Estas decisiones se realizaron muy a disgusto de don Blas: “ y con justa razón me opuse a que se abandonase el Castillo y se echasen a pique los navíos, pero he reconocido que muchos meses a esta parte ha despreciado este caballero cuanto he dicho ” 9. Ante la cercanía del enemigo el Conquistador (64) no es barrenado correctamente siendo capturado por los ingleses y para mayor desgracia la medida no impidió el trasiego de los barcos británicos a la bahía interior. A tal punto llegaron las desavenencias entre los dos defensores, que Lezo pidió le relevaran de su cargo, Eslava no dudó en tomarle la palabra. Sin embargo siguió combatiendo para impedir el desembarco de tropas de en las inmediaciones del cerro de La Popa. Este accidente geográfico suponía una amenaza para el castillo de San Felipe de Barajas que defendía el acceso a la ciudad. Por ello los ingleses se lanzaron contra La Popa que, sin las convenientes defensas que proponía Lezo, cayó en sus manos el día 17 de abril.

Sólo quedaba someter el castillo de San Felipe de Barajas y Cartagena estaría a merced del fuego de este. Para ello ya habían tomado el cerro de La Popa desde donde cañonearían la fortificación mientras se lanzaba un asalto de infantería. La suerte del castillo y de Cartagena de Indias estaba prácticamente sellada. Ambos bandos preparaban el combate final, en el lado ingles se subió la artillería a La Popa mientras que se desembarcaban tantos hombres y pertrechos que hablaban de una ofensiva a gran escala; en el lado español ante la crítica situación el Virrey Eslava repone en el mando a Lezo que ordena desbrozar las inmediaciones para no dar cobertura al enemigo y cavar un foso alrededor del fuerte que conectara con una trinchera zigzageante situada a lo largo de la ladera del lado Sur. También envió dos supuestos desertores a los ingleses para tenderles una trampa y ordenó que trajesen al castillo la reserva de marinos dejando indefensa la ciudad, retiró a los civiles a la misma y voló el puente de acceso a ella. El comandante español dispuso en la trinchera 650 soldados y dentro del castillo 300, más la reserva de 200 marinos. Los ingleses asaltarían simultáneamente la fortaleza por los cuatro costados. Se avanzaría por el Sur aunque el grueso de la tropa se centraría en el lado Este, el más empinado pero con deficiencias en la fortificación según la información errónea de los dos supuesto desertores. Del lado Oeste se encargarían los colonos norteamericanos mientras que en el norte se haría una maniobra de distracción Vernon no quiso dar apoyo naval al asalto, puesto que debía internarse en un estrecho canal en el que la superioridad del San Felipe de Barajas era evidente. Sin embargo también exigió rendir el fuerte del Manzanillo, el del Pastelillo ya una compañía que quedó aislada en una playa ante su avance.

Figura 9 – Movimientos ingleses en la campaña.

En la madrugada del 20 de abril de 1741 comienza el asalto final al castillo de San Felipe de Barajas. Las tropas inglesas que avanzan por el Este son engañadas y se ven de repente bajo el fuego del castillo sin tener otra opción que intentar finalmente el asalto, pero cuando llegan a la muralla las escalas se quedan cortas dos metros, los mismos que tenía el foso ideado por el comandante español. Al Oeste las tropas norteamericanas tienen el mismo problema, produciéndose en ambos frentes una verdadera carnicería entre los atacantes incapaces de escalar las murallas: “ …rechazados al fusil por mas de una hora y después de salido el Sol en un fuego continuo y biendo los enemigos la ninguna esperanza de su intento (…) se pusieron en bergonzosa fuga al berse fatigados de los Nuestros los que cansados de escopetearles se abanzaron a bayoneta calada siguiendolos hasta quasi su campo… ” 10.

Among the strengths of both Manzanillo and firmly resisted Pastelillo. Blas de Lezo has made the south side, defended by a trench and fortification itself, not the one with more effective enemies and yet be the only effective option to attack the real goal that would give the victory. British Artillery La Popa is forced to spread the fire on the entrenched positions, thus preventing the softening of the castle. The very design of the trench allowed to cover several sides at once and not be overwhelmed to the first charge, while its location gave a favorable position on the side with the enemy by lifting and protected by the fort, besides the land coverage offered protect effectively allowed the English cannon. British troops advance towards the south side of the castle without knowing that while on the other fronts his countrymen are being slaughtered under a terrible fire, and now the fate of the race is on them. The rifle fire is intense and British soldiers are unable to progress easily spend hours and the forces of both sides are focusing on the same side, but the British are suffering a great wear up the slope under the tropical sun and the Spanish fire. The British sent 400 men to strengthen the fight but still just as stuck, until the Spanish midday call to prayer they stop their fire and something that will be respected by the attackers while doing a dead silence on the battlefield. Resumed the war and shortly after the break the British are starting the touch of assault combat with fixed bayonets. The stop artillery fire on the infantry except when there are Spanish folds that are overcome by a ratio of four to one, despite the issue to the combat reserve of 200 sailors. The battle line reached the foot of the fortress, several points of the trench have been exhausted, the battle is fierce, and the Spanish soldiers are beginning to show signs of weakness. Blas de Lezo realize that is the decisive moment of battle, is an all or nothing, and gives the order to its 300 sailors, who served the guns of the castle and were his only garrison, go to the load. The exhausted British were overwhelmed in a critical moment in the battle to the freshness and vigor of the men, being driven from that position and pursued by the Spanish troops began a retreat down the hill. Before these events the assailants to ascend the slope were also overwhelmed psychologically and flight became infected between the English forces, resulting in a disorderly stampede that left at the mercy of the Spanish and caused the slaughter of the English. They were persecuted by the defenders to the stern where they captured the guns that were there. The final assault was over, he had signed another glorious chapter to the Spanish arms.

The tenacious defense Lezo raised around the site of Cartagena sought wear the enemy as possible to reach a final showdown with real possibilities, something that in itself represented a success against such overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Like the Peninsular troops were decimated by tropical diseases upon arrival in Cartagena de Indias, the entire period of the apparently absurd resistance posed by Lezo promoted the development of disease in the enemy. Cartagena's defenses were designed for this purpose: "It was, therefore, to repel the attack of northern European troops, unaccustomed to tropical climates and poorly immunized against diseases in these latitudes. The assailant had necessarily to achieve their objectives quickly, before the heat, humidity, malaria and yellow fever were to become invincible allies of the besieged. En Cartagena se estimaba un plazo de seis a ocho semanas para que las huestes tropicales llegasen invisibles a defender la plaza ” 11. Los ingleses se vieron obligados a mantenerse demasiado tiempo en el mar, algo que unido a la falta de costumbre de aquellos hombres a las enfermedades tropicales, provocaron el surgimiento de epidemias entre sus tropas. Este proceso fue acelerado por la ambición de Edward Vernon quien, tras tomar Bocachica, decidió no enterrar a los muertos (suyos y ajenos) para lanzarse rápidamente contra la ciudad. Los soldados ingleses estaban padeciendo verdaderas calamidades por parte de la naturaleza y de su mando, ello explica que se desmoronaran de golpe y no pudieran asumir un nuevo asalto a San Felipe de Barajas. Además las desavenencias en la oficialidad británica, el egoísmo y crueldad de sus comandantes provocaron numerosas decisiones fatales y el desrrumbamiento físico y moral de su tropa. Blas de Lezo logró, no sin dificultades, resistir desde primera línea sin que se produjera el descalabro de sus tropas, obligando al enemigo a desgastarse excesivamente y llevándole a un asalto final en el que ya no podía ejercer su superioridad numérica, donde magistralmente encauzó el ataque al frente que dispuso, rechazándolo con brillantez.

El 26 de Abril, Vernon pone postreramente al buque Galicia (70) a disparar contra el fuerte de San Felipe de Barajas. Este barco había sido la nave capitana de Lezo, siendo capturada a los españoles en la toma de Bocachica cuando no cogió fuego a tiempo. El propósito de la misión suicida era humillar el honor español y vengarse. El combate terminó con el Galicia (70) desarbolado y en un calamitoso estado tras recibir el cañoneo simultaneo de las defensas de la ciudad, el fuerte de San Sebastián del Pastelillo y el propio San Felipe de Barajas. Finalmente fue incendiado, unas fuentes hablan que por los propios ingleses cerca del fuerte del Manzanillo y otras por los españoles después de acabar con sus tripulantes, poniendo en llamas el velero que llevado por el viento prendió en otras embarcaciones y material de guerra británico con grave destrucción y pérdidas. Sea como fuere se trata, como los continuos bombardeos sin objetivo alguno, de una muestra de la impotencia de Vernon ante la derrota.

El día 8 de mayo las fuerzas inglesas muestran claros signos de retirada y comienzan su marcha, hasta que el día 20 del mismo mes desaparecen todas las velas inglesas. Antes de su marcha continuaron sus bombardeos y en el momento de su partida Vernon se vio obligado a incendiar cinco buques por falta de tripulación y de regreso a Jamaica tuvo que hundir otro más. Cargados de hombres moribundos, sus barcos parecen hospitales. Más tarde volverá a rondar Cartagena, pero desistirá de cualquier ataque al ver las defensas reparadas y se dirigirá entonces a atacar sin éxito La Habana. Caerá en desgracia a su llegada a una Inglaterra humillada que celebró imprudentemente una victoria que todavía no se había producido. Los historiadores ingleses ocultaron vergonzosamente lo ocurrido en Cartagena de Indias por orden de Jorge II y que pago Nelson en Tenerife, al que sin embargo encumbraron quizás para tapar lo ocurrido en 1741 y los años posteriores, en ese supuesto “ pudiésemos haber sido víctimas de una gigantesca campaña de publicidad pro Nelson mantenida hasta nuestros días ” 12.

Las bajas inglesas en la campaña de Cartagena fueron tremendas, quedando la flota de guerra de su armada prácticamente desmantelada:

• 3500 muertos en combate.
• 2500 muertos por enfermedades.
• 7500 heridos en combate.
• 6 navíos de tres puentes.
• 13 navíos de dos puentes.
• 4 fragatas.
• 27 transportes.
• 1500 cañones capturados o destruidos por los españoles.

Del lado español los daños fueron también importantes, llegando casi al límite de lo que podía soportar la guarnición:

• 800 soldados.
• 1200 heridos.
• 6 navíos de dos puentes.
• 5 fuertes.
• 3 baterías.
• 395 cañones.

“ Cada barco y soldado español hizo frente y derrotó a 10 ingleses ” 13. El resultado es tan increíble que el propio Lezo, pecando de humildad, atribuye la victoria “ a las misericordias de Dios ” 14. El caso es que las bajas fueron muy graves, “en términos relativos los atacantes habían perdido un 15% de su fuerza y los defensores un 20%, pero pese a esta relativa ventaja local el efecto era mucho peor para el visitante ” 15.

Pero existen informaciones más dramáticas de los propios combatientes ingleses que hablan por si solas de la debacle y la tragedia que se cernió sobre ellos: “ Por la cuenta honesta tuvimos 18000 hombres muertos, y según un soldado español que capturamos, ellos perdieron a lo sumo 200. El Almirante Una Pierna con su excelente mando y fuego mató a 9,000 de nuestros hombres, la fiebre general mató un número parecido. Cuando eché la última mirada al puerto de Cartagena, su superficie era gris con los cuerpos putrefactos de nuestros hombres, que murieron tan rápidamente que nosotros no podíamos enterrarlos. De los agricultores pobres y débiles de nuestras colonias norteamericanas murieron cuatro hombres de cada cinco ” 16.

Tras la tempestad no vino la calma. Sebastián Eslava, Virrey de Nueva Granada, se guardó las desavenencias con el marino vasco y escribió varias veces al Rey pidiendo castigo para Lezo, cosa que al final logrará hundiéndole social y económicamente. El marino vasco intenta conservar el prestigió y la fama ganadas durante 40 años de su vida entregados al servicio de Su Majestad Felipe V, escribiendo a sus amigos de la península, remitiendo el diario de lo acontecido en Cartagena de Indias. Patiño, su gran valedor, intenta mediar ante el rey, pero este bastante trastornado y ya envenado por las informaciones de Eslava ignorará lo que alega Lezo. Pero este ya estaba enfermo, unas fuentes afirman que por las heridas sufridas y otras por las enfermedades transmitidas tras la matanza ocurrida semanas antes. El 7 de septiembre de 1741 muere en Cartagena de Indias sin recibir sepultura conocida por las penurias monetarias y sociales que padeció su mujer por culpa de aquellos rencores. Nadie se atrevía a mostrar su cercanía por miedo a las represalias. La situación fue tan cruel que incluso muerto fue destituido aunque posteriormente se rehabilitó su figura y se le concedió a título póstumo el marquesado de Ovieco. Así desapareció un almirante leal, valiente y tenaz, brusco pero humilde, pragmático a la par que ingenioso (quizás adelantado a su tiempo) y con perfecto dominio del factor psicológico, uno de los militares más brillantes que ha dado el país y me atrevería a decir que el mejor de su época, pero a la vez uno de los más olvidados por esta, en ocasiones, ingrata España que le negó su última voluntad, una placa al píe del castillo de San Felipe de Barajas que rezaría verazmente: “ Ante estas murallas fueron humilladas Inglaterra y sus colonias ” 17.

Figura 10 – Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta

* Nota: Las cifras que aparecen entre paréntesis junto al nombre de cada una de las embarcaciones indican el número de piezas de artillería que podían disponer las mismas.

Citas:

1 Victoria, P. (2005). The day that Spain beat England. Altera. Pág. 121.

2 Idem. Pág. 122.

3 Picatoste, V. (1898). “El general pierna de palo”. La Ultima Moda: Glorias de España (núm. 14). Pág. 24.

4 Segovia Salas, R. (2003). Las fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias: estrategia e historia . Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango del Banco de la República. < http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/historia/fortificaciones/fortif2.htm >

5 Carta de don Blas de Lezo al vicealmirante Edward Vernon en respuesta a la que este ultimo le envió tras la toma de Portobello. Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Audiencia de Santa Fe Cartagena, correspondencia de Blas de Lezo, años 1738-1741, estante 119, cajón 2, legajo 11.

6 Victoria, P. (2005). The day that Spain beat England. Altera. Pag. 179.

7 Smollett, T. (1995). Roderick Ramdom . Penguien Classics. Pág. 143 a 199.

8 Torres, AE (1955). Homenaje a don Blas de Lezo. El último biógrafo del almirante Edward Vernon. Una versión inglesa de su asalto a Cartagena de Indias . Casanalpe. Pág. 28.

9 Lezo, Blas de. (1741) Diario de lo acaecido en Cartagena de Indias desde el día13 de marzo de 1741 hasta el 20 de mayo del mismo año, que remite a Su Majestad don Blas de Lezo . Museo Naval de Madrid.

10 Segovia Salas, R. (2003). Las fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias: estrategia e historia . Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango del Banco de la República. < http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/historia/fortificaciones/fortif3.htm >

11 Idem. < http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/historia/fortificaciones/fortif1.htm >

12 Mangado, P. (2003). “Blas de Lezo y Edward Vernon: la invencible inglesa frente a Cartegena de Indias”. El Astillero (núm. 5, págs. 31-38). Pág. 36.

13 Quintero Saravia, GM (2002). Don Blas de Lezo: defensor de Cartagena de Indias . Planeta Colombiana. Pág. 273.

14 Lezo, Blas de. (1741) Diario de lo acaecido en Cartagena de Indias desde el día13 de marzo de 1741 hasta el 20 de mayo del mismo año, que remite a Su Majestad don Blas de Lezo . Museo Naval de Madrid. Jueves 20 de Abril de 1741.

15 Quintero Saravia, GM (2002). Don Blas de Lezo: defensor de Cartagena de Indias . Planeta Colombiana. Pág. 277.

16 Pembroke, J (1741) “True Account of Admiral Vernon's conduit of Cartagena”. En: Michener JA (1990). Caribbean . Fawcett.

17 Victoria, P. (2005). The day that Spain beat England. Altera. Pág. 278.

Figures:

- Figura 1 – Retrato de Blas de Lezo de origen desconocido.

- Figura 2 – Combate de una fragata española con el navío británico Stanhope (1710). Óleo sobre lienzo (143 x 250 cm), pintado por Angel Cortellini Sánchez (1858-1912), a principios del siglo XX.

- Figura 3 – La fragata de Blas de Lezo remolcando el navío Stanhope (1710). Óleo sobre lienzo (74 x 102 cm), escuela española (ca.1820).

- Figura 4 – Distintivo de la escuadra de Blas de Lezo (1731) con el escudo rodeado por la orden del espíritu santo y el toisón de Oro. Museo Naval de Madrid.

- Figura 5 – Fotografía del castillo de San Felipe de Barajas en la actualidad con la estatua de Blas de Lezo al pie del mismo señalando la dirección por donde apareció la flota inglesa.

- Figura 6 – Plano de Cartajena, su puerto y su península de Tierra bomba hasta Boca chica en estado de ofensa y defensa por disposición del Excmo. Mr. D. Blas de Lezo, comandante general de los presentes navío galeones de SM Católica. 1940. En: Planos de ciudades iberoamericanas y filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias (1982). Instituto de Estudios de Aministración Local y Diputación de Granada.

- Figura 7 – Ataque británico en Cartagena de Indias (1741). Óleo sobre lienzo (50 x 70 cm), de Luis Gordillo (1994), copia de una litografía de los Episodios marítimos, publicada en Madrid en 1849. Museo Naval de Madrid.

- Figura 8 – Moneda acuñada en Inglaterra (1941). Aparece Blas de Lezo rindiendo su espada, arrodillado, ante el almirante Vernon. Al anverso una leyenda en latín dice: “ La arrogancia española humillada por el almirante Vernon ”. Museo Naval de Madrid.

- Figura 9 – Movimientos de la campaña contra Cartagena de Indias. Elaboración propia.

- Figura 10 – Retrato de don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta, marqués de Oviedo, teniente general de la Real Armada. Óleo sobre lienzo (94 x 79 cm), escuela española, copia anónima del año 1853 de un original propiedad de sus descendientes. Uniforme grande establecido en 1724. Museo Naval de Madrid.

Bibliografía:

• Elías Ortiz, S.; Vargas Martínez, G. (2006). El verdadero desastre del ataque británico a Cartagena de Indias (Colombia), en 1741 . Todo a Babor. < http://www.todoababor.es/articulos/art_2.htm >

• Gandarillas, MA (2000). La Invencible inglesa en Cartagena de Indias (Marzo de 1741) . < http://usuarios.lycos.es/pay/lezo.htm >

• Lezo, Blas de. (1741) Diario de lo acaecido en Cartagena de Indias desde el día13 de marzo de 1741 hasta el 20 de mayo del mismo año, que remite a Su Majestad don Blas de Lezo . Museo Naval de Madrid.

• Mangado, P. (2003). “Blas de Lezo y Edward Vernon: la invencible inglesa frente a Cartegena de Indias”. El Astillero (núm. 5, págs. 31-38).

• Museo Naval de Madrid. (2006). < http://cvc.cervantes.es/actcult/museo_naval >

• Picatoste, V. (1898). “El general pierna de palo”. La Ultima Moda: Glorias de España (núm. 14).

• Pembroke, J. (1741) “True Account of Admiral Vernon's conduit of Cartagena”. En: Michener JA (1990). Caribbean . Fawcett.

• Quintero Saravia, GM (2002). Don Blas de Lezo: defensor de Cartagena de Indias . Planeta Colombiana.

• Segovia Salas, R. (2003). Las fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias: estrategia e historia . Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango del Banco de la República. < http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/historia/fortificaciones/indice.htm >

• Silos Rodríguez, JM (2006). La defensa de Cartagena de Indias . Todo a Babor. < http://todoababor.webcindario.com/articulos/defens_cartag.htm >

• Smollett, T. (1995). Roderick Ramdom . Penguien Classics.

• Torres, AE (1955). Homenaje a don Blas de Lezo. El último biógrafo del almirante Edward Vernon. Una versión inglesa de su asalto a Cartagena de Indias . Casanalpe.

• Victoria, P. (2005). The day that Spain beat England. Altered.

• Wikipedia. (2006). < http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blas_de_Lezo > < http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sitio_de_Cartagena_de_Indias_%281741%29 >